The November deal was described by the former EU Ambassador in Ankara, Marc Pierini, as "realpolitik" at its worst 2 as geostrategic pressure forced the EU to bend its previously immutable principles of liberal democracy. The July 2016 coup d'etat attempt has further stretched the credibility of any semblance of commitment to liberal democracy in Turkey with the wide scale "purging" of tens of thousands of alleged conspirators not only in the military but in education, the judiciary and the media 3 . Whether continuing migration will oblige the EU to bend its rules even further, and what the long term effect might be, are yet to be seen. What is clear however is that the landscape in which Turkey-EU accession is currently taking place has changed dramatically in the two years since this special issue project began.
However, the co-editors contend that this actually adds weight to the argument that the stalemate reached soon after accession negotiations were opened in 2005 has been an opportunity missed. It has to be considered that this was a prime chance for the EU to continue to incentivise Turkey to carry out liberal constitutional reform. It must also be considered that Turkey may not have become as illiberal if accession had remained a viable option. A more liberal democratic Turkey may even have stopped the migration issue becoming a crisis which required such a "realpolitik"-driven response.
Phinnemore and Icener look at the reasons why the door to Turkey is not closed but progress remains only at a "snail's pace". It concentrates on the EU side of events and explores how the EU has engaged with Turkey and how Turkey-EU relations fit into the wider enlargement dynamic. It identifies five variables for closer examination: integration capacity, member state preferences, public opinion, supranational activism and the ongoing enlargement narrative. This comparative approach highlights that Turkey has proceeded more slowly than other comparable accession states and argues that Turkey's lack of progress cannot therefore be simply put down to wider enlargement fatigue.
It does concede that the Turkish case has been caught up in a wider desire to tighten the conditionality involved and to place more emphasis on chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security). Hence Phinnemore and Icener conclude that: "The outlook for Turkey's membership bid is far from rosy, and this is before consideration is given to the commitment of the Turkish government to the process and its capacity to implement the necessary reforms" (2016). However, they do add that the door for Turkey remains at least half open and has been "re-energised" by the migration issue. Ebru Turhan's paper also looks at member state preferences and their influence on Isabel David's contribution to this special issue is to argue that progress towards EU accession was always dependent on its compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and therefore, after, 2002, was in the hands of the AKP. Moreover the paper argues that the AKP never intended to democratise and used the EU instrumentally to consolidate its political power base within Turkey. In other words, the AKP took a strategic attitude to democratisation in accordance with an application of Rational Choice theory. It was a rational choice to use EU accession as a vote-winner in the first place and then to use conditionality instrumentally in order to bolster its own position. For example, reform of civil military relations were a particularly important part of EU conditionality which were stressed repeatedly in the European Commission's annual progress reports. However the military were also a crucial part of the political establishment's opposition to the AKP and Erdogan's party was able to use EU "norms" to clip the political wings of the military.
David utilises a number of hypotheses to reach these conclusions. She argues that whilst the EU is influential in democratisation (and Europeanisation) this is less likely to happen in a political system with a dominant political party. The AKP has won every election since 2002 and can be considered as such. The paper argues that this was because democratisation would increase the plurality of the political system and thereby create political opponents. Moreover, David contends that democratisation is less likely in a country, like Turkey, with deep cleavages in socioeconomic, ethnic and religious terms. Lastly, the paper theorises that the dominant party will use existing institutions to consolidate a power base and ultimately that democratisation will depend on the underlying inclination and motivation of the political actors in question.
Hence, the paper argues that the AKP used EU reforms to limit the powers of those The first is what she calls 'external and internal actors' interference with the functions of government'. By which she argues that there is good evidence that in Turkish politics independence of the bodies of the government have been undermined by the dominant presence and active role of i) external actors or Turkish armed forces (for they are not a branch of government) or ii) internal actors or President Erdogan (for it is a branch of government). According to Icoz this ultimately made it difficult for the Turkish authorities to meet the democratic credentials of the EU, and hindered the implementation of the necessary EU reforms. The relationship between Turkey and the EU was problematised both before and after Turkey began the accession negotiations. 
